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Humans and animals appear to share a similar representation of number as an analog
magnitude on an internal, subjective scale. Neurological and neurophysiological data
suggest that posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is a critical component of the circuits that
form the basis of numerical abilities in humans. Patients with parietal lesions are impaired
in their ability to access the deep meaning of numbers. Acalculiac patients with inferior
parietal damage often have difficulty performing arithmetic (2 + 4?) or number bisection
(what is between 3 and 5?) tasks, but are able to recite multiplication tables and read or
write numerals. Functional imaging studies of neurologically intact humans performing
subtraction, number comparison, and non-verbal magnitude comparison tasks show
activity in areas within the intraparietal sulcus (IPS). Taken together, clinical cases and
imaging studies support a critical role for parietal cortex in the mental manipulation of
numerical quantities. Further, responses of single PPC neurons in non-human primates are
sensitive to the numerosity of visual stimuli independent of low-level stimulus qualities.
When monkeys are trained to make explicit judgments about the numerical value of such
stimuli, PPC neurons encode their cardinal numerical value; without such training PPC
neurons appear to encode numerical magnitude in an analog fashion. Here we suggest
that the spatial and integrative properties of PPC neurons contribute to their critical role in
numerical cognition.
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Humans possess a deep understanding of the meaning of num-
bers, and the practical use of this abstract ability is ubiqui-
tous. We rely on numerical information in a myriad of daily
tasks ranging from the simplicity of purchasing a cup of cof-
fee to the complexity of developing financial instruments like
mortgage-backed securities—irrespective of the wisdom of doing
so. Complex quantitative behaviors are not limited to humans.
Even the apparently simple behavior of a bee collecting pollen
from a flower involves the computation and comparison of rel-
ative rates of return from various patches of flowers (Couvillon
and Bitterman, 1985; Montague et al., 1995; Shapiro et al., 2001).
A wealth of research suggests that humans share with animals a
representation of number as an analog magnitude on an inter-
nal, subjective, scaled “number line” that is less precise with
increasing magnitude (Platt and Johnson, 1971; Whalen et al.,
1999).
However, there are several considerations that may constrain
the instantiation of such a numerical scaling in neural circuits.
For example, it remains hotly debated whether small numbers
(one-two-three) are represented in a qualitatively different man-
ner than larger estimated numerosities (Hyde, 2011). Moreover,
the neural signatures of numerical judgments must be compatible
with the manner in which an analog magnitude system estimates
quantity. Ultimately, the representation of quantity must be
stripped of the continuous properties of that which is quantified,
e.g., “six” has the same meaning whether it describes six drops of
water or six beluga whales. Psychophysical measurements provide
limits as to the properties that must be accounted for by the neu-
ral systems that represent quantity. One concept of such a number
line could be more literal, akin to an orderly spatial map of quan-
tity in the brain (Dehaene et al., 1993; Gut et al., 2012). Here,
we take a broader view that the properties of numerical cogni-
tion evident from behavior emerge from the response properties
of neurons in parieto-frontal circuitry, in which posterior parietal
cortex (PPC) plays a crucial role.
PSYCHOPHYSICS OF NUMERICAL DISCRIMINATION
Psychophysical data suggest that number is represented as a
point on an analog mental number line. For example, rats or
humans asked to produce n responses or estimate n events do
so with less precision as n increases (Platt and Johnson, 1971;
Whalen et al., 1999). In addition, the variability of responses
increases proportionally with n such that the coefficient of vari-
ation (CV, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean)
is constant as n increases. Indeed, members of the Piraha
tribe of Amazonia, whose numerical language is limited to
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“one-two-many,” show a similar pattern of behavior in which
both the number and variability of numerical estimates increase
with n, with a constant CV (Gordon, 2004). The similarity
between animals and humans, even those using innumerate
language, suggests a common underlying system for numerical
estimation.
Hallmarks of numerical comparison are the distance andmag-
nitude effects. Humans reporting the larger of two numbers do so
faster andmore accurately as the distance between them increases.
And, when the distance between two numbers is fixed, accuracy
and speed decrease as the overall magnitude of the two numbers
increases (Moyer and Landauer, 1967). Thus, subjects more accu-
rately and quickly discriminate 2 vs. 9 than 6 vs. 7 (distance effect)
or 32 vs. 39 (magnitude effect). Distance and magnitude effects
are also found in the accuracy and reaction times of monkeys and
pigeons ordering pairs of numerosities (Brannon and Terrace,
1998, 2000; Nieder and Miller, 2004a; Scarf et al., 2011). Figure 1
shows the similar ratio-dependence in the accuracy and speed of
monkeys and humans reporting which of a pair of numerosity
stimuli containsmore (or fewer) elements (Cantlon and Brannon,
2006). These behavioral findings endorse the idea that the internal
representation by the mental number line has greater variability
with increasing quantity. Such a number line could be logarithmi-
cally compressed or linear with scalar variability (Brannon et al.,
2001; Dehaene, 2001).
Performance of simple approximate arithmetic tasks suggests
that these operations are carried out using an analog representa-
tion of quantity. Participants who cannot rely on the rote mem-
orization of basic mathematical operations (such as 2 + 3 = 5)
nevertheless demonstrate the ability to perform simple calcula-
tions. Pre-schoolers accurately report whether the sum of two
arrays of dots contains a larger number than a comparison array
(Barth et al., 2006) and monkeys can choose a visual array that
matches the sum of two sample arrays (Cantlon and Brannon,
2007). Even pigeons can discriminate the result of a subtraction
operation from a constant value (Brannon et al., 2001; Dehaene,
2001). The Munduruku tribe of Amazonia, which lacks lan-
guage for quantities greater than five, can estimate the results of
approximate addition and subtraction, as well as compare quan-
titative stimuli well beyond their range of numerical literacy (Pica
et al., 2004). Further, in these studies, accuracy for mathemat-
ical operations depended on the ratio of quantities compared.
These findings suggest that mathematical operations are com-
puted over a representation of quantity that is either linear with
scaled variability or logarithmically compressed.
A critical prediction of Weber’s law is that the ratio of two
numbers determines their discriminability, regardless of their
actual magnitude. Several lines of evidence using tests of
non-symbolic numerical processing suggest number is innately
represented on a compressed analog scale that supports ratio-
dependence in discriminations. Human infants have been shown
to discriminate large numbers, provided they differ by a ratio of
2:1, e.g., 8 vs. 4 or 16 vs. 8 (Xu and Spelke, 2000; Lipton and
Spelke, 2003; Wood and Spelke, 2005). Adult human discrim-
ination of non-symbolic visual arrays has also been shown to
depend on the ratio of values compared, rather than their absolute
magnitude (Piazza et al., 2004, 2007). A potential advantage of
compressed scaling is the ability to process a wide range of quan-
tities, just as the visual or auditory systems can process stimuli
differing over orders of magnitude.
In studies of non-verbal subjects, such as animals and human
infants, the confounding relationship between number and other
stimulus attributes makes it difficult to demonstrate the capacity
to represent number per se. For example, choices based on
FIGURE 1 | Humans’ and monkeys’ judgments of relative numerosity
(more/fewer) depend on the ratio difference between the two stimuli.
When judging arrays of dots that differ in quantity, accuracy increased (A) and
response time decreased (B) as their ratio deviated from 1. For example,
discrimination performance for 2 vs. 10 (ratio = 0.2) was faster and more
accurate than for 9 vs. 10 (ratio = 0.9). From Cantlon and Brannon (2006).
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simultaneously presented stimuli that differ in number could
be determined on the basis of such features as total surface
area or density whereas the discrimination of sequentially pre-
sented stimuli, or production of a series of n responses, could
be controlled by duration (of individual elements or the entire
series) rather than number. More generally, number, space, and
time all show similar properties of discriminability that follow
Weber’s law (Walsh, 2003), thus it is difficult to disentangle
judgments based solely on numerosity apart from spatial and
temporal magnitudes. Although animals are able to use number,
it is possible that they do so only as last resort (Davis and Perusse,
1988). This proposition seems unlikely since both humans and
animals performing tasks that do not oblige them to represent
number do so (Meck and Church, 1983; Roberts and Mitchell,
1994; Brannon and Terrace, 1998; Roitman et al., 2007a; Jordan
et al., 2008). Number thus appears to be spontaneously encoded,
even when it is redundant with other cues.
NEUROBIOLOGY OF NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION
Neurological and neurophysiological data indicate that parietal
cortex is a critical component of the circuits that form the basis of
numerical abilities in humans. Patients with parietal lesions are
impaired in their ability to access the deep meaning of numbers.
Acalculiac patients with inferior parietal damage often have diffi-
culty performing arithmetic (2 + 4?) or number bisection (what
is between 3 and 5?) tasks, but are able to recite multiplication
tables and read or write numerals (Dehaene and Cohen, 1991,
1997; Cohen and Dehaene, 1994). Gerstmann syndrome, which is
characterized by the tetrad of acalculia, left-right disorientation,
finger agnosia, and agraphia, is found in patients with inferior
parietal damage (Gerstmann, 1940; Roeltgen et al., 1983; Benton,
1992). The progress of Gerstmann syndrome onset in Alzheimer’s
disease patients suggest that the degeneration underlying these
four cognitive impairments share anatomical proximity in the
parietal lobe (Wingard et al., 2002). Further, Turner’s syndrome,
an X-linked chromosomal disorder in humans, is marked by
both structural abnormalities of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and
abnormal development of numerical representation (Molko et al.,
2003).
Complementary data from fMRI studies of neurologically
intact humans performing subtraction (Simon et al., 2002), num-
ber comparison (Pinel et al., 2001), and non-verbal magnitude
comparison (Fias et al., 2003) tasks show activity in the IPS. Taken
together, clinical cases and imaging studies support a critical
role for parietal cortex in the mental manipulation of numeri-
cal quantities. More specifically, Simon et al. (2002) suggest that
the functional organization of human parietal lobe resembles that
found in monkeys (Rizzolatti et al., 1998), and propose that cor-
relates of numerical processing in primates may be found in areas
along the IPS.
Studies of the role of parietal cortex in non-symbolic numer-
ical representation in humans have produced conflicting data.
Imaging studies have consistently reported the activation of pari-
etal cortex in the processing of symbolic number, i.e., number
words or Arabic numerals (Dehaene and Cohen, 1997; Pinel
et al., 2001; Simon et al., 2002). To test whether representation
of number in parietal cortex extends to non-symbolic stimuli,
Piazza et al. (2004) employed an fMRI adaptation paradigm.
In that study, human participants passively viewed visual arrays
of n elements. As subjects habituated to a standard number
(16 or 32), deviant values, ranging fromhalf to double the value of
the standard, were presented infrequently. Although participants
were not explicitly required to discriminate the visual stimuli in
any way, recovery of the BOLD signal along right and left IPS
was proportional to the ratio of the standard and deviant stim-
uli (Figure 2). The same regions did not respond to changes
in the shape of the elements. Further, adaptation to repeated
numerosities and recovery in response to a deviant numeri-
cal value did not depend on whether non-symbolic (arrays of
dots) or symbolic (Arabic numerals) stimuli were used (Piazza
et al., 2007). Thus, brain activation by deviant numerical stim-
uli followed Weber’s law. Subsequent studies not only replicated
the adaptation of regions along the IPS to non-symbolic visual
stimuli, but extended these findings to proportions (Jacob and
Nieder, 2009). Subjects habituated to arrays of elements in which
50% (of totals ranging from 4 to 32) were colored blue and the
rest were red. Infrequent probes with deviant stimuli composed
of 60–90% red items drove recovery of the BOLD signal, with
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FIGURE 2 | Areas along the horizontal intraparietal sulcus showed
activation in response to a change in the numerosity of
sequentially presented visual stimuli. The level of activation was
proportional to the magnitude in the change of numerosity from a
habituated standard value (16 or 32). The discriminability of probe values
relative to the standard is compressed on a linear scale (A), and
symmetrical on a logarithmic scale (B), consistent with Weber’s law.
Reprinted with permission from Piazza et al. (2004).
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greater recovery as the distance between habituation and deviant
proportion increased. Thus, regions along the IPS not only appear
to encode estimates of whole numbers, but proportions as well.
Counter to the suggestion that dedicated circuitry in parietal
cortex is responsible for processing symbolic and non-symbolic
quantity, Shuman and Kanwisher (2004) did not find adap-
tation of parietal responses to repeated presentations of non-
symbolic numerical stimuli. Although they found greater IPS
activation for difficult non-symbolic numerical comparisons,
similar patterns of activation were observed for difficult color
comparisons, suggesting that activation of this region is not lim-
ited specifically to the number domain. Ongoing research using
electrophysiological methods (described below) similarly sug-
gests that broader functions of parietal cortex support numerical
cognition.
The earliest findings of a neural representation of number
in animals also suggested a role for parietal cortex. Neurons in
parietal cortex in anesthetized cats responded to the nth stimu-
lus in a series, regardless of modality or inter-stimulus interval
(Thompson et al., 1970). In monkeys, parietal neurons in area 5
were shown to respond to repetition number in a sequence of
arm movements (Sawamura et al., 2002). These neurons had
somatosensory receptive fields, but approximately one-third of
the neurons studied had activity that was also modulated in
relation to the position of the movement in a sequence. When
inactivated, monkeys were impaired in completing the num-
ber of required repetitions of movements accurately, suggesting
that these neurons were required to track the number of move-
ments completed (Sawamura et al., 2010). Although the major-
ity of studies related to neural encoding of quantity focus on
regions within parietal cortex that process visual and oculomotor
function, the work of Sawamura and colleagues shows simi-
lar encoding of quantity in circuits that process somatosensory
information in armmovements.
The strongest evidence for neural correlates of numerical
quantity has been found in the activity of single neurons in PPC of
macaque monkeys judging visual stimuli varying in numerosity.
PPC has been implicated in higher order sensorimotor processing
and while not primarily sensory or motor in function, receives
inputs from multiple sensory modalities and influences move-
ment planning. There are several characteristics of PPC neurons
that have implications for our interpretation of how quantity may
be encoded at the level of single neurons. The areas along the
IPS are considered to be part of the dorsal visual pathway car-
rying information about the location and movement of objects,
and guiding eye or hand movements toward those objects in
space (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982). The ventral intrapari-
etal area (VIP), located in the fundus of the IPS, is situated to
process visual and somatosensory information via inputs from
the middle temporal (MT) and medial superior temporal (MST)
visual areas, and from somatosensory areas 5 and 7 of the supe-
rior parietal lobule (Seltzer and Pandya, 1986; Ungerleider and
Desimone, 1986; Boussaoud et al., 1990; Duhamel et al., 1998).
Neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), in the lateral bank
of the IPS, also receive inputs from visual motion areas MT
and MST, but are driven by auditory stimuli as well (Felleman
and Van Essen, 1991; Mazzoni et al., 1996b; Mullette-Gillman
et al., 2005). Area LIP is interconnected with areas involved in
the generation of saccadic eye movements, such as the superior
colliculus and frontal eye field (Baizer et al., 1991). Anterior to
LIP along the lateral bank of the IPS is the anterior intraparietal
area (AIP), which responds to both visual stimuli and grasping
movements of the hand (Jeannerod et al., 1995; Sakata et al.,
1995). Intraparietal neurons are thus ideally situated to organize
perception of multimodal stimuli toward appropriate behavioral
responses.
A defining trait of neurons along the IPS is their spatially
selective response fields (RF). These neurons respond to stim-
uli presented in Colby et al. (1996) and/or movements directed
toward (Barash et al., 1991; Mazzoni et al., 1996a) a restricted
area of space, typically in the contralateral hemi-field. The spa-
tial selectivity of parietal neurons is modulated by a variety of
task parameters, such as the salience of visual stimuli (Colby and
Goldberg, 1999), motor planning (Snyder et al., 1997), decision-
making (Shadlen andNewsome, 2001), categorization (Freedman
and Assad, 2006), reward expectation (Platt and Glimcher, 1999;
Sugrue et al., 2004), social expectations (Klein et al., 2008), and
elapsed time (Leon and Shadlen, 2003). In addition, responses of
parietal neurons can be affected by non-spatial information such
as shape and color (Sereno and Maunsell, 1998; Toth and Assad,
2002), as well as information located outside of the classical RF
(Freedman and Assad, 2009).
Neurons in PPC were first shown to encode the cardinal value,
e.g., “4,” of visible objects in monkeys performing a delayed-
match-to-sample task (Nieder and Miller, 2004b). On each trial,
a sample stimulus containing 1–5 elements was presented, fol-
lowed by a delay period in which no stimuli were visible. After
the delay, a test stimulus containing either the same number of
elements or a set that differed by one element was presented.
The locations of the elements were randomized around a cen-
tral fixation point, and monkeys reported when the test stimulus
matched the sample by releasing a lever. Thus, the spatial con-
figuration of the stimuli was not matched to the RFs of neurons
studied, and themotor response did not have a spatial component
such as a reach or eye movement to a particular target. The area,
circumference, arrangement, density, and shape of the items in
the numerosity stimuli were systematically varied to ensure that
number alone was the basis for a match. Consistent with stan-
dard magnitude effects on numerical performance, behavioral
response accuracy declined as the number of items in the sample
increased. In an additional set of behavioral experiments where
the sample and test stimuli differed by more than one element,
performance improved as the difference between the sample and
test stimuli increased (Merten and Nieder, 2009). The perfor-
mance of monkeys in this task thus demonstrated distance and
magnitude effects like those seen in Brannon and Terrace (1998,
2000).
While monkeys performed the delayed-match-to-numerosity
task, the activity of randomly selected neurons in prefrontal and
PPC was measured. For approximately one-third of neurons in
prefrontal cortex (PFC), ∼20% of neurons in the fundus of the
VIP, and ∼10% of neurons in the lateral bank of the intrapari-
etal sulcus (LIP), activity measured during the presentation of the
sample stimulus or the delay period wasmaximal for one quantity
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and declined as distance from that quantity increased. “Tuning”
curves for numerosity were broader as numerosity increased from
1 to 5, suggesting a possible correlate of numerical distance and
magnitude effects (Nieder et al., 2002; Nieder and Miller, 2003).
Figure 3 shows an example of a single neuron with tuned for
the preferred value of “3.” For numerosities up to 30, individ-
ual PFC neurons preferred a particular value, with tuning curves
better fit by logarithmic rather than linear scaling (Nieder and
Merten, 2007). The onset of numerical discrimination by parietal
neurons preceded that of prefrontal neurons by ∼30ms, suggest-
ing that quantity is initially encoded in PPC then passed to PFC
for task-related processing (Dehaene, 2002; Nieder and Miller,
2004a).
In addition to coding the quantity of elements in simulta-
neously presented numerical arrays, VIP neurons show simi-
lar preferences for a preferred ordinal position in a numerical
sequence, i.e., respond best to the second stimulus, regardless of
whether the number of elements in the sequence is 1, 2, 3, or 4
(Nieder et al., 2006). The tuning for preferred sequence posi-
tion resembles that for preferred numerosity, in that different sets
of neurons represent each of the possible ordinal positions. In
fact, in VIP a larger proportion of neurons (∼22%) were selec-
tive for sequential quantity than were selective for simultaneous
quantity (∼12%). The two populations did not overlap—that
is—single neurons did not exhibit an abstract preference for “3,”
regardless of whether presented simultaneously or sequentially
during the sample viewing period. During the delay period, when
subjects are presumably holding an abstract representation of
quantity in working memory, neurons representation of quantity
FIGURE 3 | Single neurons in posterior parietal cortex and prefrontal
cortex (shown) respond most strongly for a “preferred” numerosity.
In this example, firing rate was most elevated for arrays of “3” in a
delayed-match-to-numerosity task, and declined with numerical distance
from 3. Reprinted with permission from Nieder et al. (2002).
did not depend on the format of presentation. Overall, the find-
ings suggest coding for ordinal position as well as cardinal value
in VIP that potentially drives representation of cardinal value
in PFC.
In the explicit delayed-match-to-numerosity task, it is possi-
ble that factors other than number modulated neural responses.
The majority of number-selective neurons in PFC and PPC pre-
ferred the quantity “1” (Nieder et al., 2002; Nieder and Miller,
2004b). Behavioral studies also showed that monkeys’ accuracy
was highest when the sample value was 1 (Nieder and Miller,
2004a). An alternative explanation for the over-representation of
the value 1 by neurons may be that the responses also convey
information about reward expectations. It is possible that mon-
keys were more certain of achieving rewards when the sample
value was 1, and this certainty is reflected in the discharge of some
neurons categorized as preferring 1 (Leon and Shadlen, 1999). In
this task, monkeys have extensive experience with a limited range
of numerosities, and potentially treat cardinal number as other
stimulus categories (Freedman et al., 2002; Freedman and Assad,
2006).
Extensive experience with categorization of visual stimuli as
governed by task demands may contribute to the generation
of different patterns of neural responses. In the non-symbolic
numerical stimuli contain cardinal values of stimulus elements
(e.g., 1, 2, 3, etc.), thus while we hypothesize that these values
correspond to values drawn from a continuous representation of
quantity, the stimuli themselves are inherently categorical. When
monkeys were tasked with the discrimination of the continu-
ous variable of line length, neurons in VIP exhibited tuning for
one preferred line length from four possibilities, similar to tun-
ing for cardinal value in numerosity tasks (Tudusciuc and Nieder,
2009). Thus, the delayed-match-to-sample task requires subjects
to categorize even continuous stimulus characteristics, and the
patterns of neural activity observed may be a product of expe-
rience and/or task demands. Indeed, when tested on comparisons
of relative magnitude (“greater than” or “less than” a sample) PFC
neurons did not show selective responses at the time the mon-
keys viewed the sample stimulus. Only when the monkeys were
told which comparison rule to perform did task-related modu-
lation emerge (Bongard and Nieder, 2010). Although monkeys
viewed the same numerical arrays as those used in the delayed-
match-to-numerosity task, the neural responses were qualitatively
different. Rather than peaking for one cardinal value, most neu-
rons represented the mathematical rule (“greater than,” “less
than”), suggesting that they carry higher-level cognitive signals,
rather than performing a basic calculation of quantity. It is not
known whether PPC neurons likewise might encode a rule for
quantitative comparisons while monkeys perform this task, or if
they maintain a representation of magnitude/cardinal value for
such comparisons.
Given the human literature supporting a strong role for PPC
in numerical cognition, it is perhaps surprising that a greater pro-
portion of neurons in VIP and LIP were not driven by numerical
stimuli in the previous studies. Several models of how to calculate
numerosity from a set of elements include the process of accu-
mulation as a critical step (Meck and Church, 1983; Dehaene and
Changeux, 1993; Verguts and Fias, 2004). Neurons in LIP have
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been proposed to integrate information with respect to their RFs.
Monkeys discriminating the direction of motion of a random-dot
stimulus behave as though they integrate the amount of informa-
tion in the stimulus (measured as percent coherence) across the
viewing duration (Gold and Shadlen, 2000, 2002). While mon-
keys view the motion stimulus outside of the RF, neurons in LIP
show time- and motion coherence-dependent increases in activ-
ity that reach a common level when a decision to shift gaze into
the RF is reached (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). That is, when an
eye movement is used to report the direction of visual motion,
the activity of single LIP neurons increases with the amount of
evidence favoring the eye movement toward its RF. Here, the
integration of information is toward the initiation of a motor
response. While related to the amount of information contained
in the motion stimulus, the activity does not report the strength
or direction of the motion in the manner of a sensory MT neu-
ron (Britten et al., 1992). The pattern of activity exhibited by LIP
neurons has been modeled as the accumulation of sensory infor-
mation from visual area MT toward a “threshold,” at which time
a binary decision is complete and the eye movement initiated
(Mazurek et al., 2003).
The notion that LIP neurons would estimate the number of
stimuli within their spatially selective RFs by the computation of
integration was directly tested using an implicit numerical dis-
crimination task similar to that used to map numerical processing
of the IPS in humans (Piazza et al., 2004). Here, monkeys pas-
sively viewed arrays of dots with different numerosities ranging
from 2 to 32 located within the RF of each LIP neuron stud-
ied (Roitman et al., 2007b). In each block of trials, a standard
numerosity (e.g., “8”) was presented on half of the trials, while
on the remaining half a deviant numerosity (2, 4, 16, or 32)
was displayed. Although monkeys were required only to maintain
fixation on a central point while the stimulus was displayed, pre-
sentation of a deviant stimulus predicted that the monkey would
receive a larger reward for completing a gaze shift to a target in
the opposite hemi-field from the RF when the fixation point was
extinguished. Other stimulus variables (size, color, area, density)
were controlled to not systematically vary with number.
When visual arrays were presented within the RFs of LIP
neurons, and monkeys were not trained to explicitly discrimi-
nate numerosity, the majority of LIP neurons recorded (54%)
had activity that was significantly modulated by the number of
elements in the visual array. Neurons responded in a graded
manner, either increasing or decreasing activity as the number
of elements increased (Figure 4). Responses did not depend on
other stimulus characteristics, or whether the numerosity served
as standard or deviant in a given block of trials. The neurons
with increasing responses resemble what would be expected by
the integration of the number of elements within the RF. Similar
monotonically increasing responses have also been observed in
parietal neurons encoding the rate of a mechanical vibration
applied to the fingertips (Hernandez et al., 2000, 2002). Neurons
with responses that decreased with increasing numerosity may
reflect the operation of other processes. In the random-dot
motion discrimination, for example, LIP neurons show a time-
and coherence-dependent reduction in activity when evidence
favors a saccade away from the RF (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002;
Mazurek et al., 2003). Multiple stimuli within a RF lead to
competitive interactions and a reduction in activity in superior
colliculus neurons, which are strongly interconnected with LIP
(Li and Basso, 2005), in a process akin to divisive normalization
(Carandini and Heeger, 2011).
Positive and negative profiles of graded responses are suffi-
cient to support the basic characteristics of numerical judgments.
Number
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FIGURE 4 | Single neurons in the lateral parietal area (LIP) respond in a
graded manner to numerosity. Arrays containing 4–32 elements were
presented within the response fields of LIP neurons in an implicit task, while
the subjects prepared to shift their gaze away from the array. Neuronal
firing rate either increased (A) or decreased (B) with larger numerosities.
From Roitman et al. (2007b).
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 25 | 6
Roitman et al. Numerosity encoding in PPC
In numerical bisection tasks, participants tend to treat the geo-
metric mean of large and small anchor values as the subjective
midpoint, e.g., 4 as the midpoint between 2 and 8 (Meck and
Church, 1983; Jordan and Brannon, 2006). That the subjective
midpoint falls at the geometric, rather than arithmetic, mean pro-
vides further evidence that mental estimations are based on ratio
differences between numbers. Numerical bisection judgments
also show superposition—regardless of the range of anchors
tested (2 vs. 8, 3 vs. 12, 4 vs. 16) the probability that an inter-
mediate value is judged as “large” depends its ratio to the “large”
value. Bisection points at the geometric mean and superposing
judgments can be predicted over a range of anchor values based
on a calculation of the difference between the responses of posi-
tive and negative neurons reported in LIP (Pearson et al., 2010).
Because the “ideal” performance of a pair of neurons with mono-
tonic responses (one increasing and one decreasing) produce
judgments with sensitivity greater than that exhibited behav-
iorally, the model matches behavior by pooling noisy neurons,
much as that needed by computational comparisons of neuronal
and psychophysical sensitivity in visual area MT (Shadlen et al.,
1996). The graded response profiles of LIP neurons can, there-
fore, support numerical judgments consistent with Weber’s law
and without explicit representation of cardinal numerical value.
This type of coding scheme of number has adaptive value as
it can represent a wide range of values, without having to rep-
resent every possible number explicitly. To date, there are not
data to address the maximum non-symbolic quantity that can
be encoded with a graded coding scheme or the extent to which
this value depends on experience/task-demands. For example,
responses in LIP could increase to some maximum firing rate,
which could correspond to the maximal numerosity the circuitry
could represent. Alternatively, neural responses may adapt in
order to encode multiple ranges of numerosities, such that when
asked to discriminate values ranging from 1 to 5, the numeros-
ity “5” elicits maximal responses, but when asked to discriminate
values ranging from 2 to 64, scaling is compressed such that
“64” elicits a maximal response, with less precision at interme-
diate values. The range over which such scaling might occur, and
the adaptations single neurons might display have not yet been
explicitly tested.
Thus, the measurements of single neuron responses to date
yield two patterns of numerosity encoding-graded responses in
LIP and peaked tuning curves for cardinal value in VIP and PFC.
Models of numerical processing that ultimately represent cardi-
nal number utilize an accumulation stage to sum the number
of stimuli before converting this accumulated value to numeros-
ity (Dehaene and Changeux, 1993; Verguts and Fias, 2004).
These findings are consistent with models in which the repre-
sentation of numerosity in VIP is derived from LIP inputs, and
are then subsequently communicated to PFC to use as a cat-
egorical decision rule. Recent modeling has shown that units
detecting the numerosity of visual stimuli emerge from a net-
work learning to represent visual arrays (Stoianov and Zorzi,
2012). These numerosity detectors showed spatial selectivity like
neurons in LIP, and encoded numerosity on a compressed ana-
log scale. It is possible that differences in task demands and
experience lead to the different patterns of responses in pari-
etal cortex. In the implicit numerical discrimination task used
by Roitman et al., monkeys were never required to employ
the information about quantity to explicitly guide behavior.
Behavioral data suggest that monkeys do attend to the numeros-
ity of the stimulus, as saccade response times decreased with
increasing differences of the deviant value from the standard,
although there was no explicit report of cardinal value. In addi-
tion, stimuli in the implicit numerical discrimination task were
tailored to the spatial properties of neurons, while those in
the delayed-match-to-numerosity used by Nieder and colleagues
were not.
The degree to which numerical sensitivity in parietal cor-
tex depends on the spatial properties of the task performed
remains unclear. Recent work has challenged the classical view of
PPC physiological responses solely guiding sensorimotor trans-
formations to guide spatial behavior. Neurons in LIP, originally
thought to be involved in visual attention or oculomotor inten-
tion, have been shown to respond to stimuli outside of the
RF. In monkeys reporting the category of the direction of a
random-dot motion stimulus, LIP neurons also discriminated
category identity, even when the stimuli were presented out-
side of the RF and the behavioral response was the (non-
spatial) release of a lever (Freedman and Assad, 2009). Similarly,
neurons in LIP report the decision about the direction of a
random-dot motion stimulus (right vs. left) in the absence of
an available choice target for motor planning (Bennur and Gold,
2011). This flexibility of PPC responses beyond the confines of
spatially restricted RF is considerably greater than previously
considered.
Behavioral evidence from human, infant, and animal studies
suggest that numerosity is represented in a common, non-verbal
format in which larger quantities are represented with less pre-
cision, resulting in judgments that follow Weber’s law. Patients
with PPC damage show deficits consistent with the notion that
this region is necessary to support the estimation of quantity
and understanding of the deep meaning of numbers. Converging
findings from human imaging studies and non-human primate
electrophysiological recordings support the idea that neurons
within PPC respond to quantity with both graded responses that
represent magnitude and tuning to identify cardinal value. While
it has not been shown that the spatial arrangement of favors a
more literal embodiment of a “number line,” the physiological
response profiles can functionally encode numerosity in a man-
ner that can begin to account for the psychophysics of numerical
judgments. Future investigations of the neural bases of numerical
cognition should address a number of issues. Do these patterns
of responses denote separate analog magnitude estimation and
cardinal value systems? Is the representation of cardinal value
derived from graded estimates of magnitude? To what extent are
these representations innate, or do they depend on explicit train-
ing and experience? How do they form the basis for such simple
computations as addition or division? The answers to these ques-
tions will undoubtedly shed light not only on the role of PPC
in numerical cognition, but also its related abstract cognitive
functions.
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